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Abstract
Formal institutions impact on the dynamics of land use change through their objectives, actions and decision-making
processes in response to socio-economic or environmental changes such as climate change. The effects and interplay
of these actions are not fully understood, and hence, institutional processes are rarely integrated in modelling
analyses of land use change. The complex effects of institutional interactions within land systems can be better
understood through modelling approaches that address the heterogeneity of the institutional actors involved and how
their decisions affect temporal and spatial dynamics. In this paper, we present an agent-based model of autonomous
land managers interacting with institutional agents at two spatial scales. We explore different parameters of institu-
tional intervention (subsidy rate, triggers for action, delay in monitoring, scale-based precedence) under socio-
economic drivers and analyse key metrics such as the maximum over- and undersupply of ecosystem services,
connectivity of land uses, and degree of change in land use patterns. Levels of subsidy and action triggers have
the greatest impact on the magnitude of land use change and the maximum oversupply of ecosystem services. In
terms of achieving institutional objectives, subsidy rate is the most important single parameter in the model.
Furthermore, we find non-linearity with variations in parameters that have important implications for current land
use change modelling and requirements for empirical studies of land use planning institutions. Finally, the effects of
high-end climate change may require entirely novel institutional behaviours.
Keywords Land use change . Governance . Formal institutions . Decision-making . Complex socio-ecological systems .
Agent-basedmodelling
Introduction
Understanding the land use system and its possible future
development is crucial for the design of effective environmen-
tal policies. This is especially important as the dynamic nature
of climate (Porter et al. 2014), demography (e.g. through mi-
gration and ageing) and consumption patterns (Mulligan et al.
2014) increasingly have substantial impacts on the land use
system. More rapid socio-economic disturbances such as eco-
nomic crises or policy changes, e.g. following the collapse of
the Soviet Union (Hostert et al. 2011; Prishchepov et al. 2012)
can also have dramatic effects on land use. Effects on land use
are likely to be particularly large under high-end climate
change, not only due to changes in the productivity of land
but also due to changes in demand for ecosystem services
arising from population dynamics (Mulligan et al. 2014;
Stürck et al. 2015). In turn, changes in land use affect the
provision of ecosystem services such as carbon storage
(Robinson et al. 2013), habitats (Butler et al. 2007) and the
non-material benefits of landscapes.
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Land use dynamics are tightly interlinked with the activi-
ties of formal institutions such as governmental agencies or
non-governmental organisations at different spatial levels
(Lambin et al. 2001). While local conditions and land manag-
er decisions are responsible for the actual distribution of land
use change, regional and (supra-)national institutional and
market processes inform these local decision processes
(Verburg 2006; Willemen et al. 2012). The extension of inter-
governmental regimes in global governance of the environ-
ment by civil society organisations (CSOs), expert networks,
and multinational corporations during recent decades has in-
creased interaction amongst these actors and policy levels.
The complexity of interactions has also increased because of
overlap in regulatory content and the dissolution of the prin-
ciple of territoriality (Pattberg and Widerberg 2015). For in-
stance, the spread of organic farming is supported by a mix of
policy instruments such as subsidies, product labels and ad-
vice, implemented by governmental bodies and non-
governmental organisations (Stolze and Lampkin 2009;
Jaime et al. 2016). Furthermore, institutions play a key role
in adaptation to climate change, with objectives including se-
curing ecosystem service provision, the dissemination of ef-
fective adaptation strategies, and smoothing out shocks.
Multilevel coordination and the interplay between govern-
mental, administrative agencies and the private sector are im-
portant aspects in determining the adaptive capacity of indi-
vidual land managers (Mimura et al. 2014; Nay et al. 2014).
Imperfect knowledge arising from delayed or inaccurate
monitoring, susceptibility to lobbying, imperfect rules for trig-
gering actions, and expectations about intervention timescales
affect the ways in which institutions intervene. For example,
hierarchical governance structures can lead to mismatches be-
tween the objectives of policy makers and bureaucrats at a local
level (York et al. 2006). Additionally, the design of interven-
tions is hampered by uncertainty of climate change and popu-
lation dynamics, untested strategies, and time lags in imple-
mentation (Lyle 2015; Koontz et al. 2015). At the same time,
institutional action may have severe unintended effects on the
provision of ecosystem services through path dependencies
(Pierson 2000), e.g. when legacies of a previous policy
supporting a certain land use prevent future more holistic inter-
ventions (Howlett et al. 2009). Furthermore, institutions change
over time, interact with one another and operate at the regional,
national or international levels in linked, but distinctive ways
(van Zanten et al. 2013) (see section 3.4 in Rounsevell et al.
(2014) for a discussion of institutions in land systems).
Understanding the interplay of institutional actions at dif-
ferent spatial levels within the land system is therefore chal-
lenging (Paloniemi et al. 2012), and projecting their impacts
more difficult still. Moreover, high-end climate change re-
quires transformative solutions and, accordingly, tools that
address multiple feedbacks, irreversibility, non-linearity and
tipping points (Tàbara et al. 2018). The necessary
simultaneous assessment of policy processes, applied prac-
tices, drivers, impacts and uncertainties can be supported by
dynamic modelling, which also allows for the exploration of
various socio-economic and environmental scenarios (Balint
et al. 2017). Crucially, such an approach enables the represen-
tation of institutional actions, the omission of which may lead
to biased or misleading simulation results (Parker et al. 2003;
Manson 2005).
Dynamic models have a number of important require-
ments. Investigating direct or indirect interactions between
multiple institutions at different levels or with different pref-
erences requires their explicit inclusion within models. In
terms of adaptation to global change, explicit consideration
of triggers that motivate action, and time lags that limit their
effectiveness, is necessary (Holman et al. 2018). There is also
a need to incorporate constraints related to imperfect knowl-
edge or limitations of power that operate in the real world.
Agent-based models (ABMs) are able to satisfy many of
these requirements. They can represent the heterogeneity of
system entities such as land managers and formal institutions
in terms of attitudes, objectives, strategies and actions,
amongst other characteristics (Wilson and Hart 2000; Arneth
et al. 2014; Morgan et al. 2015; Mercure et al. 2016).
Moreover, agent-based modelling allows the isolation of par-
ticular mechanisms and therefore the identification of efficient
ways to improve institutional decision-making. Such models
have been used, for example, to explain inefficiency in policy
uptake arising from decision-based time lags (Alexander et al.
2013; Brown et al. 2016).
However, in spite of the importance of institutions in affect-
ing land use systems, they have not yet been represented as
autonomous, responsive entities in large-scale land use change
models. Instead, institutional actions are usually represented as
external drivers, with simulations conducted under fixed as-
sumptions about policy interventions in distinct runs that are
compared afterwards (Rounsevell et al. 2014). Only a few
models have attempted to represent institutions as explicit en-
tities that are able to interact with the land use system (Schulze
et al. 2017; Brown et al. 2017). For example, Schouten et al.
(2013) compared the impacts of agri-environment scheme
(AES) payments on habitat networks in the context of volatile
milk market conditions, but did not allow institutions to react to
network configuration. Caillault et al. (2013) found various
effects of isolated and combined incentives on land use
patterns at global, intermediate, and local levels, but again did
not model responses to system dynamics. Polhill et al. (2013)
explored the performance of four government agents’ strategies
in providing incentives to support biodiversity in a small, ab-
stract model region. While their modelled subsidies varied ac-
cording to land manager activity and species’ occurrence, the
strategies themselves were static over time.
Here, we present a mid-level ABM (O’Sullivan et al. 2015)
that integrates formal institutions as autonomous entities at
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‘global’ and regional-scale levels (‘global’ is used here to refer
to the full geographic extent of the modelled area). Institutions
are designed in the model to perform actions according to their
preferences and knowledge of current conditions, therefore
allowing for crucial feedbacks in the land use system. The
purpose of this paper is to explore how institutional action
can be better represented in models of land system change
and to investigate the institutional dynamics that arise from
this improved representation especially in interactions across
spatial-scale levels. Identification of the most important pa-
rameters in terms of the interventions’ effectiveness towards
institutional objectives is ultimately intended to highlight sen-
sitivities and effective adjustments in real-world institutional
action.
Methods
We apply CRAFTY SIRIOS,1 an instance of the CRAFTY-
CoBRA2 modelling framework, to undertake experiments in
institutional processes (see Online Resource 2 for an ODD+D
(Müller et al. 2013) description and Fig. 1: for a schematic
overview). CRAFTY-CoBRA is a derivative of the CRAFTY
framework (Murray-Rust et al. 2014; Blanco et al. 2017a, b)
that is able to represent decision-making for a wide range of
institutional actions. The model takes initial land use and cap-
ital levels (human, social, financial and manufactured capital)
as well as the societal demand for ecosystem services over
time and simulates outputs of land use change and the supply
of ecosystem services. Subsequent sections describe the mod-
el region, the way land managers are represented as agents,
institutional agents’ decision-making and their preferences,
and experimental design.
Model region
Land use change was simulated annually over 30 years (be-
cause input data is limited to that period) in three adjacent
administrative regions (NUTS-23) with a total area of 26,296
(8628, 8316 and 9352) cells of 1 km2 each (see Fig. 1 in
Online Resource 1). This spatial domain is large enough to
apply institutions meaningfully at regional and global levels,
and spans a range of land covers and uses, with similar areas
of intensive and extensive cropland and grazing as well as
forest. The initial land use is that of 2010, based on the
CLUE (Stürck et al. 2015) land cover data (Institute for
Environmental Studies 2016a) and agricultural land use inten-
sity (Institute for Environmental Studies 2016b).
Representing land managers
Different kinds of land managers are represented by agent
functional types (AFT), comprising a behavioural component
(BC) that describes decision-making and a functional role
(FR) that describes land use, i.e. the set of provided services
and associated productivities. This is based on the concept of
human functional types (Rounsevell et al. 2012; Arneth et al.
2014) that identifies different types from distinct functional
roles, decision-making strategies and preference sets. We de-
fine extensive and intensive cereal and livestock farmers as
well as forest managers as broad AFTs (Brown et al. 2016), all
with simple rule-based decision-making (these AFTs are listed
with their parameter values in Online Resource 1, Table 1). In
this semi-abstract setting, the heterogeneity of land managers
within AFTs is captured by drawing parameter values from
AFT-specific, random distributions.
We consider the provision of the ecosystem services ce-
reals, meat, and timber. Production of each service λc is
modelled by a Cobb-Douglas-style function (Douglas
(1976); see Eq. (1)), taking into account capital sensitivities
λcs and optimal production os (see Online Resource 1
Tables 2 to 6). Six capitals (crop productivity, livestock pro-
ductivity, forest productivity, infrastructure, economic capital,
natural capital) are used to model the productive potential of
land (see Online Resource 1, Fig. 2 and Table 7 for initial
values and data sources). Extensively managing functional
roles have lower sensitivities to capitals, but also lower opti-
mal production levels compared to intensively managing
functional roles. Thus, compared to intensive farmers, exten-
sive farmers are more successful on less productive cells, but
less successful at more productive locations.
ps ¼ os ∏
i∈C
cλ
c
s
i ð1Þ
The benefit functions (Online Resource 1, Table 8) deter-
mine the value of the production of an additional unit of a
particular service, given the service’s residual demand (the
difference between defined demand and the previous year’s
supply). Demands for each region were set to match service
supply of the initial land use map (based on given production
functions and capitals data) and then varied over time in re-
sponse to a set of scenario assumptions (see Online Resource
1, Tables 9 to 11). This approach was used to drive the model
dynamics and was not intended as a comparative scenario
exercise. Land manager agents compete for cells according
to their production of services and their preferences for
abandoning (giving up) their land management and allowing
a change in management (giving in). The giving-up threshold
specifies the benefit value below which land managers leave
1 Competition for Resources between Agent Functional TYpes in SImulation
of Responsive Institutions On multiple Scales
2 Competition for Resources between Agent Functional TYpes with
COmponent-Based Role Agents
3 NUTS (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) is a hierarchical clas-
sification of the economic territory of the EuropeanUnion. NUTS-2 designates
basic regions for the application of regional policies (eurostat 2016).
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the system. Where the incumbent agent’s benefit is lower than
the benefit of a competing agent minus the giving in value, the
competing agent takes over the cell. Probabilities for giving up
and the allocation of unmanaged cells introduce time lags,
reflecting delayed reactions to market conditions partly moti-
vated by the costs of land use change.
Institutional agents’ preferences and behaviour
A ‘global’ and three regional institutions were defined, with
the objectives of service supply meeting demand ‘globally’
and regionally, respectively. These institutional agents were
able to monitor supply and demand, and intervene by
subsidising certain AFTs. Once the supply-demand gap of
an observed service (cereal, meat, timber) exceeds a defined
threshold, an institution triggers a decision-making process to
choose an action that is designed to close the gap according to
the institution’s preferences (see Table 1 for an overview of
represented institutions, their preferences, and their potential
actions, and section BIndividual Decision-Making^ in
Online Resource 2). Institutions select a single functional role
of landmanagers whose most-supplied service is subsidised in
order to increase the land managers’ benefits and enable them
to take over from other land managers (see Fig. 2). Therefore,
institutions interact with land mangers indirectly when they
control the benefit from particular services, and landmanagers
respond when they abandon production of certain services and
establish production of others.
Four preferences guide institutional decision-making: a pref-
erence for less expensive actions (denoted as ‘LOW_COST’), a
preference for supplymatching demand at global level (denoted
as ‘GLOBAL_DEMAND_MATCHING’), a preference for
supply matching demand at regional level (denoted as
‘REGIONAL_DEMAND_MATCHING’) and a preference
for actions assumed to have greater public support (denoted
as ‘SOCIAL_APPROVAL’). The ‘LOW_COST’ preference
is expressed as a willingness to subsidise extensive, rather than
intensive, land managers on the basis that each produces less
service and therefore receives less subsidy. To measure a
potential action’s usefulness for demand matching of each ser-
vice, institutional agents consider the proportion of cells that
potentially can be taken over by subsidised land managers (i.e.
where their benefit exceeds that of the incumbent land manager
by its giving-in parameter), and assume that they would not be
able to take over without subsidies. Furthermore, the relative
optimal production of subsidised farmers (os in Eq. (1)) and
forest managers is taken into account, multiplied by the subsidy
rate and the supply-demand gap of the particular service: it is
preferable to support those agents that produce relatively more
of a service that is needed. Under SOCIAL_APPROVAL, ac-
tions are modelled to enhance public support when they benefit
larger numbers of land managers and when they benefit exten-
sive, rather than intensive, landmanagers. The parameter values
for the four preferences (see Table 1) have been determined to
be representative of different institutional priorities at different
scales and, are determined according to plausibility assump-
tions (see Table 12 in Online Resource 1) and not varied during
the experiments presented here. These preference values are
important as they characterise differences between potential
actions and therefore influence their selection (see Table 13 in
Online Resource 1 for an overview of potential actions and
details of the calculation of each action’s utility values).
The selection of interventions is done deliberatively, with
all available actions evaluated: their current utility towards
each of the preferences is multiplied by the institution’s pref-
erence weight and summed to result in an intervention’s score
(see Table 14 in Online Resource 1 for the evaluation of two
potential actions). The highest scoring intervention is selected.
This process is modelled by the LARA (Lightweight
Architecture for boundedly Rational Agents) framework
(Briegel et al. 2012). The decision is boundedly rational in
the sense that the evaluation of actions is based on heuristics
rather than perfect knowledge of their effects.
Experimental design
We investigated four parameters that influence the institutional
decision-making process: coordination between hierarchical
Fig. 1 A schematic description of the structure of CRAFTY SIRIOS.
Blue boxes are agents, red boxes are other CRAFTY components,
white boxes denote variables and grey boxes are externally defined
parameters. Arrows represent data flows, if not labelled otherwise. Land
managers produce services according to their production function based
on the properties of the cell they manage. Together with regional demand
for services the productions determine the demand-supply gap which
enters into the benefit function and is considered by regional and global
institutions for their decision about which functional roles to subsidise.
The allocation of new land managers is based on benefit values
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levels, the sensitivity of reaction, the degree of revision and the
strength of interventions (see Table 2). Coordination between
hierarchical levels is simulated assuming that the ‘global’ insti-
tution monitors and intervenes during odd time steps (and is
therefore the first to act) while the regional institutions act dur-
ing even time steps (parameter Precedence switched on).
Alternatively, institutions at the regional and ‘global’ level act
independently at the same time (set of simulations when pa-
rameter Precedence is switched off). The sensitivity of reaction
is simulated by the Triggering threshold above which a supply-
demand gap triggers action and is varied between low and high
values, representing fast and slow reactions. The degree of
revision refers to the Action lifetime of an implemented action,
which takes values of 1 and 4 years. The duration also defines
the waiting time for subsequent measures, as institutions are
assumed not to be able to perform multiple actions at the same
time. Finally, the strength of interventions is simulated in terms
of the Subsidy rate, which has a major impact on land use
dynamics as it determines the competitiveness of subsidised
land managers. Subsidy rate is added to the constant term of
the benefit functions (see Table 8 in Online Resource 1).
To evaluate the impact of parameters of institutional action,
a set of land use metrics are calculated (see Table 16 in
Online Resource 1 for exact definitions and detailed
descriptions). These measure the variability of land use
(‘Number of land use changes’), the degree of service supply
(‘Maximum oversupply’, ‘Mean oversupply’, ‘Mean under-
supply’ and ‘Mean regional undersupply’, all relative to the
demand of a particular service), impacts on conservation
(‘Proportion of extensively managed cells’) as well as effi-
ciency of institutional action (‘Number of performed actions’
and ‘Number of performed extensive land use-targeted ac-
tions’). The metrics were recorded for each time step of the
simulation and then aggregated as mean or maximum values.
To explore the impact of specific parameters of institutional
behaviour, we conducted a Design of Experiment (DoE) anal-
ysis (Law 2007; Lorscheid et al. 2011). The DoE approach
provides an overview of the effects of particular parameters. It
compares response variables across all model runs with the
‘low factor’ values against all model runs with the ‘high fac-
tor’ values (see Table 2). Thus, a parameter’s impact is deter-
mined under different settings of the other parameters. We
simulated every combination of parameter values, resulting
in 2^4 = 16 experiments. Since the model involves stochastic
elements (see ODD+D protocol in Online Resource 2) we
analysed the variation of all recorded metrics and decided to
perform 20 repetitions with distinct random seeds. This means
a relative experimental error (half length of the 95% confi-
dence interval divided by the mean) of below 0.10 for all
response variables except ‘Number of land use changes’, for
which the experimental error is 0.16 (see Fig. 3 in
Online Resource 1). To explore effects apart from the low
and high parameter factors, we performed sensitivity analysisTa
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for the triggering threshold and the subsidy rate as these have
the highest effects on recorded metrics. Applying default
values for all other parameters, subsidy rate was varied
between 0.0 and 0.3 and added to the benefit, which on
average across all land managers and over the entire
simulation time span is about 0.07 in the absence of
subsidies, and triggering threshold from 1 to 30% of
service demand.
Results
We start by presenting results of the Design of Experiments
analysis to provide an overview of parameter effects on land
use metrics. We then focus on the sensitivity analysis of trig-
gering threshold and subsidy rate, before we give insights into
the effectiveness of parameters when it comes to desired de-
velopments of particular metrics.
Design of Experiments
The effects of each of the analysed parameters were recorded
as the difference between low and high factors from the DoE
analysis, as shown in Fig. 3. An increase in the triggering
threshold (i.e., institutions are more reluctant to take action)
decreased the number of performed actions, the maximum
global oversupply across all services, and also the mean global
over- and undersupply. Consequently, more reactive institu-
tions are prone to cause undesired outcomes when they inter-
vene too strongly in situations where the system would other-
wise correct spontaneously.
The subsidy rate had significant impacts on most of the
response variables except mean undersupply. As subsidies
increased, the number of actions, especially those targeting
extensive land uses, decreased. While the number of land
use changes, maximum and mean oversupply increased for
higher subsidies, the mean regional undersupply of cereals
decreased. Therefore, fewer actions come at the cost of more
fluctuations and higher oversupply, with a larger number of
less costly actions allowing institutions to implement more
successful strategies.
However, the picture is different when subsidy rate is con-
sidered jointly with the triggering sensitivity. Figure 4 shows
performed actions, number of land use changes and maximum
oversupply as well as supply-demand gaps over time for two
runs with contrary parameter settings. Together with high trig-
gering thresholds, high subsidy rates led to relatively few fluc-
tuations and smoother transitions to optimal supply, even
Table 2 Parameter variations of Design of Experiments. To explore a parameter’s impact simulations have been conducted with a low factor value and a
high factor value. See text for details
Parameter Factor low Factor high Dimension Rational for inclusion
Precedence On Off Boolean Represents the level of coordination between
institutions on different hierarchical levels
Triggering threshold 3 20 % demand Addresses the tendency to intervene. Institutions
can be either pro-active or reluctant
Subsidies rate 0.15 0.4 Benefit Representing the extent of intervention; the
average benefit without subsidising across all
land managers and ticks is about 0.7; can be
set by institutions subject to their resources
Action lifetime 1 4 Ticks Addresses the frequency of revision of
interventions and can be set by organisations
liberally
Fig. 2 Depending on residual
demand for a specific service,
land managers have a benefit
from producing that service.
Subsidies raise the original
benefit function (orange for
cereal) by the subsidy rate (blue)
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though it took longer to mitigate undersupply (left part of
figure). By contrast, higher reactivity combined with lower
subsidy rates still caused perturbations leading to more land
use change (right part of figure). An important reason is the
inactivity of the ‘global’ institution in the first scenario,
preventing undesired interactions with the regional institu-
tions. In other words, substantial (costly) actions that were
only prompted by substantial deviations from the desired out-
come proved to be a relatively efficient form of intervention.
The precedence of the ‘global’ institution had minor effects
apart from reducing the number of performed actions, whereas
the number of land use changes decreased only slightly.
However, a commitment to specific actions for longer periods
prohibited short-term reactions and thus caused higher maxi-
mum and mean oversupply, but less mean ‘global’ and region-
al undersupply. Interestingly, the number of land use changes
was also slightly reduced: the longer lifetime of actions helped
different institutions to focus on a specific service and to raise
the production of under-supplied services in an enduring way
without fluctuations due to coordination problems. In general,
adverse impacts of longer lifetimes were limited, but these
caused around 15% more actions to be performed, increasing
overall expense. There was therefore a trade-off between
short-term, responsive actions that limited fluctuations in sup-
ply, and longer-term, less responsive actions that improved
mean supply levels.
Sensitivity analyses
The sensitivity analyses allow conclusions to be drawn about
the interplay between the parameters and metrics. Less reac-
tive subsidising agencies (expressed by higher triggering
thresholds) reduced the number of interventions, the number
of land use changes, and also the proportion of extensively
managed cells (see Fig. 5). The analyses of over- and under-
supply metrics all show non-linear effects with changes in the
triggering threshold. There is a (local) maximum in deviations
from the demand for institutional action that is triggered at
supply-demand gaps of about 12% of demand. Lower and
higher triggering thresholds caused less over- and undersup-
ply. Furthermore, the volatility in many metrics (e.g. maxi-
mum and mean oversupply, number of land use changes) for
small triggering thresholds, which is due to changes in param-
eter values rather than stochasticity, indicates the system’s
Fig. 3 Effects of four parameters
(triggering threshold determines
when institutions act, the
subsidies rate represents the
magnitude of subsidies, action
lifetime is how long actions are in
place, when precedence is on
global institutions act first,
followed by regional institutions
the next time step) on a set of land
use metrics from Design of
Experiments runs: compares
response variables across all
model runs with the ‘low factor’
values against all model runs with
the ‘high factor’ values (see Table
2). For example, a shift in the
triggering threshold from 3 to
20% of demand results in a
reduction of maximum
oversupply of about 20%. Error
bars show the 90% confidence
interval. Stars above error bars
denote levels of significance:
***⇨ 0.001; **⇨ 0.01; *⇨ 0.05
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sensitivity and the difficulty in predicting effects in the case of
very reactive institutions.
With the subsidy rate, it is important to find the right bal-
ance, as high subsidies tended to have adverse effects on
meeting demand levels, the number of performed actions
and the number of land use actions (see Fig. 6). In terms of
maximum oversupply as well as mean under- and oversupply
subsidy rates of about 50% were optimal. For higher subsidy
rates, even the mean undersupply across all services was
higher when certain services are over-subsidised. The number
of land use changes increased moderately with an increasing
subsidy rate up to 150% and more rapidly after that. We ob-
served a stronger increase in extensively managed cells when
the proportion of actions that target extensive land use was
higher, which demonstrates effective subsidising taking place
in the model.
Effectiveness of parameters
The most effective parameters were identified with respect to
their weighted effect on the four metrics: Proportion of
extensively managed cells, Number of performed actions,
Mean undersupply and Mean regional undersupply of cereals.
To this end, each parameter’s effects on metrics, which were
obtained in the DoE analysis, were weighted between 1 and
100 and summed across the four metrics for all combinations
of weights. Figure 7 gives the most effective parameter for
each combination of importance weight for the four consid-
ered metrics. As the figure shows, when reducing the number
of performed actions was more important (higher weights),
increases in the triggering threshold became the most efficient
measure. In other words, institutions that allowed outcomes to
deviate more widely from their target implemented fewer ac-
tions in total. Increasing subsidy rate was the best option when
weights for mean undersupply and proportion of extensively
managed cells became relevant, demonstrating the effective-
ness of more costly and substantial interventions in improving
overall performance and ensuring more consistency in
favoured forms of land management. When mean regional
undersupply of cereal had priority, a combination of higher
triggering thresholds and higher subsidy rates was beneficial,
suggesting that institutions that were less willing to act, but
Fig. 4 Performed actions and their score, representing the institution’s
belief about the efficacy of that action (top panels), percentaged change
in mean oversupply, mean undersupply and number of land uses that
change (middle panels), as well as global supply-demand gaps for
cereal, meat and timber (in percentage of their demand levels; bottom
panels) for a single run with high triggering threshold and high
subsidies rate (LHS) compared to a run with low triggering threshold
and low subsidies rate (RHS). Actions lifetime is 1, and there is no
precedence between institutions. For reasons of clarity only two of three
regions are presented (top panels). Metrics are divided by their initial
value (middle panels)
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committed themselves to more substantial interventions when
they did, improved overall regional performance (although
sometimes with the trade-off of allowing short-term fluctua-
tions in supply levels).
Discussion
The exploration of dynamic institutional interventions in a
stylised land system reveals important dynamics that would
Fig. 5 Sensitivity analysis for the triggering threshold, which is varied
between 0 and 20% of service demand in steps of 1% and between 20 and
30% in steps of 2%, towards metrics of land use. Data is based on 20
replications with distinct random seeds, and lines show mean values
whereas ribbons indicate standard deviation. Subsidy rate is 434% on
average, action lifetime is 2, and there is a delay of one time step for
regional institutions and no delay for the global institution in
monitoring, and no precedence between institutions. Metrics were
divided by their initial value (except when it was 0 as for number of
performed actions, and metrics were divided by their maximum mean
in this case). To account for different value ranges metrics are
separately shown in set 1 (left) and set 2 (right)
Fig. 6 Sensitivity analysis for
subsidy rate, which is varied from
0 to 434% subsidies of average
benefit, towards metrics of land
use. Data is based on 20
replications with distinct random
seeds, and lines show mean
values whereas ribbons indicate
standard deviation. Triggering
threshold is 5%, action lifetime is
2, and there is a delay of one time
step for regional institutions and
no delay for the global institution
in monitoring, and no precedence
between institutions. Metrics
were divided by their initial value
(except when it was 0 as for
number of performed actions, and
metrics were divided by their
maximum mean in this case). To
account for different value ranges
metrics are separately shown in
set 1 (left) and set 2 (right)
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be missed even by far more complex models that treat institu-
tional behaviour exogenously. We find that even simplified
interplay between institutions at different levels and the land
managers they affect results in highly divergent and non-linear
system dynamics that have strong implications for rates of
land use change, ecosystem service provision, and achieve-
ment of institutional objectives. The strength and significance
of these effects suggest that they justify far more attention in
theoretical and applied land system research than they have so
far received.
Non-linear effects
This study only explored a few key aspects of institutional
behaviour: coordination of action between hierarchical levels,
sensitivity to changing conditions, the extent to which institu-
tions revise their actions, and the strength of interventions.
The observed non-linearity of effects of important parameters,
such as those controlling the timing and strength of institu-
tional actions, highlights the need to account for realistic sys-
tem dynamics in policy design. For instance, the intuitive
effect of higher subsidy rates leading to more stability in land
use did not hold across the modelled experiments, with lower
rates actually producing less change and smaller supply-
demand gaps in some circumstances. Similarly, the expected
relationship between the threshold values that trigger actions
and supply-demand gaps was reversed in all but a small range
of triggering thresholds (between 8 and 12% of demand),
meaning that higher sensitivity to ecosystem service supply
levels usually increased these gaps. Notably, thresholds below
6% of service demand showed strong variations, indicating
unpredictable system behaviour. Crucially, these non-linear
effects are subject to change as the land use system changes,
suggesting that the effects of high-end climate change may
require novel, responsive institutional action.
Accuracy of monitoring vs. design of interventions
Another important characteristic of institutional behaviour
that was revealed here is path-dependency. This has previous-
ly been demonstrated in an empirically grounded model of
institutional land acquisition for conservation (Bakker et al.
2015), and we find that its strength varies with the lifetime of
institutional actions. Where institutions cannot adjust inter-
ventions promptly, changes in ecosystem service supply level
endure, but often stronger than desired and costly.
Nevertheless, the strongest effects we find relate to thresholds
for triggering action (representing sensitivity of reaction to
current economic and environmental conditions) and the sub-
sidy rate (representing strength of intervention). These
Fig. 7 Parameter with strongest effects weighted according to importance
of metrics Number of ext. managed patches (horizontal facets),
Maximum oversupply in percentage demand (vertical facets), Number
of performed actions (y axis inside facets), and Number of land use
changes (x axis within facets). When lower metric values are preferable
(all but Number of extensively managed patches), effects were negated
before summed while TriggeringThreshold represents a decrease in the
triggering threshold, TriggeringThreshold represents an increase
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particularly affect supply-demand gaps, number of land use
changes and the number of institutional actions. We also ex-
plored the impact of noise in monitoring (adding normally
distributed values with mean = 0 and sd = 0.2 to the demand-
supply gap), but we could not detect meaningful effects on
response variables. This suggests that imperfect knowledge
may be less detrimental to the achievement of institutional
objectives than imperfect design of interventions – provided
that knowledge imperfections are random, as simulated here,
and not systematically biased. To the extent that this finding is
applicable to the real world, it implies that the application of
well-understood interventions in poorly-understood circum-
stances is preferable to the application of poorly-understood
interventions, again provided that circumstances are not con-
sistently misjudged in any one way. Similarly, allowing coor-
dination of institutional actions through precedence of the
‘global’ institution had little impact beyond reducing the total
number of interventions made.
Integrated development needed to acquire necessary
data
The strength, range and variability of these effects underline
the complexity of policymaking under global change. Clearly,
this complexity also represents a challenge for decision-
support models that seek to represent institutional action.
Not only are the processes involved manifold, but also the
empirical basis for how, when, and why institutions intervene
in the land use system is still weak. Current models often focus
on regional scales and/or specific policies such as payments
for ecosystem services (Matzdorf et al. 2013) or support for
organic farming (Stolze and Lampkin 2009), but rarely con-
sider multiple scales or the interplay of a wider range of insti-
tutional interventions (Uthes and Matzdorf 2012; Daugbjerg
and Sønderskov 2012). Here, meta-studies and further empir-
ical analyses of institutional decision-making are urgently
needed to complete the picture.
In this case study, institutional preferences and parameters
were chosen to be as plausible as possible. Whilst this is ap-
propriate for an abstract setting, better-supported
parameterisations would be needed for a more realistic, ap-
plied exploration of institutional behaviour. These could be
achieved, for example, through techniques for eliciting param-
eter values in complex contexts from stakeholders
(Gramberger et al. 2015). We also propose an integrated de-
velopment in which abstract computer simulations of institu-
tional action are used to identify relevant types of institutions
and kinds of interventions for empirical research and also to
specify required data to enrich computer simulations of land
system dynamics. Data requirements are likely to extend well
beyond the parameters explored here, most obviously in terms
of the accuracy of institutional monitoring, the range and rank-
ing of preferences and inter-institutional power relations.
Moreover, simulation research about the dependence of insti-
tutional effects on the regional land use context is needed.
Investigated interventions can also include additional forms
of subsidy (Merckx and Pereira 2015), as well as regulation,
promoting innovation, improving infrastructure or facilitating
access to financial capital, all for a range of objectives includ-
ing conservation, food security, climate mitigation or adapta-
tion. The interplay of these is of great relevance to policy
making and a key target for future model applications.
Conclusion
Effective governance of the Earth system requires adaptive,
anticipatory top-down processes of policy design, and bottom-
up actions to reconfigure incentives and support behavioural
change. These in turn require integrated analysis of multiple
policies in order to understand different options, risks, stress-
es, and outcomes (Nilsson and Persson 2012). To enable such
an analysis, models need to integrate institutions as respon-
sive, internal entities, which has not been done previously in
land use models used to inform applied policy decisions
(Verburg and Overmars 2009; Britz and Witzke 2011).
The ABM presented here simulates land managers and in-
stitutional agents at a ‘global’ scale and regional scale with
distinct preferences when reacting to supply-demand gaps of
ecosystem services. Themodel is therefore capable of analysing
institutional impact on the complex temporal and spatial dy-
namics of the land use system, which is important in light of
increasing uncertainty due to climate change and population
dynamics. Simulations showed substantial, non-linear impacts
of institutions’ tendency to react (triggering threshold), extent of
intervention (subsidy rate), coordination between levels of spa-
tial scale (precedence of the global institution) and revision of
action (action lifetime). Design of Experiment analysis showed
that subsidy rate and the threshold for triggering actions are
more important than action lifetime and precedence between
institutions at the different levels in order to decrease supply-
demand gaps and the number of land use changes. Sensitivity
analysis demonstrated non-linearity in subsidy rate and trigger-
ing threshold, which suggests that both an increase and a de-
crease in the parameter value could improve outcomes for cer-
tain metrics, depending on the current parameter values and the
magnitude of change. Together, these findings indicate the rel-
evance of responsive institutional action in the exploration of
land use change, and reveal significantly different dynamics
depending on when and how institutions react compared with
a model without institutional action.
Acknowledgements This work was carried out as part of the Impacts And
Risks From High-End Scenarios: Strategies For Innovative Solutions
(IMPRESSIONS) project (http://www.impressions-project.eu/), as well as
Land-use change: assessing the net climate forcing, and options for climate
Modelling dynamic effects of multi-scale institutions on land use change
change mitigation and adaptation (LUC4C) project (http://luc4c.eu/), both
funded by the European Union’s Seventh Programme for research,
technological development and demonstration under grant agreement Nos
603416 (IMPRESSIONS) and 603542 (LUC4C).
Compliance with ethical standards
Conflict of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of
interest.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons At t r ibut ion 4 .0 In te rna t ional License (h t tp : / /
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link
to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Alexander P, Moran D, Rounsevell MDA, Smith P (2013) Modelling the
perennial energy crop market: the role of spatial diffusion. J R Soc
Interface 10:20130656. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2013.0656
Arneth A, Brown C, Rounsevell MDA (2014) Global models of human
decision-making for land-based mitigation and adaptation assess-
ment. Nat Clim Chang 4:550–557. https://doi.org/10.1038/
NCLIMATE2250
Bakker MM, Alam SJ, van Dijk J, Rounsevell MDA (2015) Land-use
change arising from rural land exchange: an agent-based simulation
model. Landsc Ecol 30:273–286. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10980-
014-0116-x
Balint T, Lamperti F, Mandel A, Napoletano M, Roventini A, Sapio A
(2017) Complexity and the economics of climate change: a survey
and a look forward. Ecol Econ 138:252–265. https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.ecolecon.2017.03.032
Blanco V, Brown C, Holzhauer S, Vulturius G, Rounsevell MDA (2017a)
The importance of socio-ecological system dynamics in understand-
ing adaptation to global change in the forestry sector. J Environ
Manag 196:36–47. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2017.02.066
Blanco V, Holzhauer S, Brown C, Lagergren F, Vulturius G, Lindeskog
M, Rounsevell MDA (2017b) The effect of forest owner decision-
making, climatic change and societal demands on land-use change
and ecosystem service provision in Sweden. Ecosyst Serv 23:174–
208. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2016.12.003
Briegel R, Ernst A, Holzhauer S, KlemmD, Krebs F, Martínez Piñánez A
(2012) Social-ecological modelling with LARA: a psychologically
well-founded lightweight agent architecture. In: Seppelt R, Voinov
A, Lange S, Bankamp D (eds) International congress on environ-
mental modelling and software 2012. Managing Resources of a
Limited Planet: Pathways and Visions under Uncertainty, Sixth
Biennial Meeting, Leipzig
Britz W, Witzke P (2014) CAPRI model documentation 2014. http://
www.capri-model.org/docs/capri_documentation.pdf. Accessed 8
March 2018
Brown C, Holzhauer S, Metzger M, Paterson J, Rounsevell M (2016)
Land managers’ behaviours modulate pathways to visions of future
land systems. Reg Environ Chang 18:1–15. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10113-016-0999-y
Brown C, Alexander P, Holzhauer S, Rounsevell MDA (2017)
Behavioral models of climate change adaptation and mitigation in
land-based sectors. Wiley Interdiscip Rev Clim Chang 8:e448.
https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.448
Butler SJ, Vickery JA, Norris K (2007) Farmland biodiversity and the
footprint of agriculture. Science 315:381–384. https://doi.org/10.
1126/science.1136607
Caillault S, Mialhe F, Vannier C, Delmotte S, Kêdowidé C, Amblard F,
Etienne M, Bécu N, Gautreau P, Houet T (2013) Influence of incen-
tive networks on landscape changes: a simple agent-based simula-
tion approach. Environ Model Softw 45:64–73. https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.envsoft.2012.11.003
Daugbjerg C, SønderskovKM (2012) Environmental policy performance
revisited: designing effective policies for green markets. Polit Stud
60:399–418. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00910.x
Douglas P (1976) The Cobb-Douglas production function once again: its
history, its testing, and some new empirical values. J Polit Econ 84:
903–915. https://doi.org/10.1086/260489
eurostat (2016) NUTS - Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics.
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/overview. Accessed 18 Aug
2016
Gramberger M, Zellmer K, Kok K, Metzger MJ (2015) Stakeholder in-
tegrated research (STIR): a new approach tested in climate change
adaptation research. Clim Chang 128:201–214. https://doi.org/10.
1007/s10584-014-1225-x
Holman IP, Brown C, Carter TR, Harrison PA, Rounsevell M (2018)
Improving the representation of adaptation in climate change impact
models. Reg Environ Chang. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-018-
1328-4
Hostert P, Kuemmerle T, Prishchepov A, Sieber A, Lambin EF, Radeloff
VC (2011) Rapid land use change after socio-economic distur-
bances: the collapse of the Soviet Union versus Chernobyl.
Environ Res Lett 6. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/6/4/045201
Howlett M, Rayner J, Tollefson C (2009) From government to gover-
nance in forest planning? Lessons from the case of the British
Columbia Great Bear Rainforest initiative. Forest Policy Econ 11:
383–391. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2009.01.003
Institute for Environmental Studies (2016a) CLUE model. http://www.
ivm.vu.nl/en/Organisation/departments/spatial-analysis-decision-
support/Clue/. Accessed 3 Aug 2018
Institute for Environmental Studies (2016b) Agricultural land use inten-
sity data. http://www.ivm.vu.nl/en/Organisation/departments/
spatial-analysis-decision-support/ag-intensity. Accessed 3 Aug
2018
Jaime MM, Coria J, Liu X (2016) Interactions between CAP agricultural
and agri-environmental subsidies and their effects on the uptake of
organic farming. Am J Agr Econ 98:1114–1145. https://doi.org/10.
1093/ajae/aaw015
Koontz TM, Gupta D, Mudliar P, Ranjan P (2015) Adaptive institutions in
social-ecological systems governance: a synthesis framework. Environ
Sci Pol 53:139–151. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2015.01.003
Lambin EF, Turner BL, Geist HJ, Agbola SB, Angelsen A, Bruce JW,
Coomes OT, Dirzo R, Fischer G, Folke C, George PS, Homewood K,
Imbernon J, Leemans R, LiX,Moran EF,MortimoreM,Ramakrishnan
PS, Richards JF, Skånes H, SteffenW, Stone GD, Svedin U, Veldkamp
TA, Vogel C, Xu J (2001) The causes of land-use and land-cover
change: moving beyond the myths. Glob Environ Chang 11:261–269.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0959-3780(01)00007-3
Law A (2007) Simulation modeling and analysis. McGraw-Hill, New
York
Lorscheid I, Heine B-O, Meyer M (2011) Opening the ‘black box’ of
simulations: increased transparency and effective communication
through the systematic design of experiments. Comput Math
Organ Theory 18:22–62. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10588-011-
9097-3
Lyle G (2015) Understanding the nested, multi-scale, spatial and hierar-
chical nature of future climate change adaptation decision making in
agricultural regions: a narrative literature review. J Rural Stud 37:
38–49. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2014.10.004
S. Holzhauer et al.
Manson S (2005) Agent-based modeling and genetic programming for
modeling land change in the Southern Yucatan Peninsular Region of
Mexico. Agric Ecosyst Environ 111:47–62. https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.agee.2005.04.024
Matzdorf B, Sattler C, Engel S (2013) Institutional frameworks and gov-
ernance structures of PES schemes. Forest Policy Econ 37:57–64.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2013.10.002
Merckx T, Pereira HM (2015) Reshaping agri-environmental subsidies:
from marginal farming to large-scale rewilding. J Basic Appl Ecol
16:95–93. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.baae.2014.12.003
Mercure J-F, Pollitt H, Bassi AM, Vinuales JE, Edwards NR (2016)
Modelling complex systems of heterogeneous agents to better de-
sign sustainability transitions policy. Glob Environ Chang 37:102–
115. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.02.003
Mimura N, Pulwarty RS, Duc DM, Elshinnawy I, Redsteer MH, Huang
HQ, Nkem JN, Sanchez Rodriguez RA (2014) Adaptation planning
and implementation. In: Field CB, Barros VR, Dokken DJ, Mach
KJ, Mastrandrea MD, Bilir TE, Chatterjee M, Ebi KL, Estrada YO,
Genova RC, Girma B, Kissel ES, Levy AN, MacCracken S,
Mastrandrea PR, White LL (eds) Climate change 2014: impacts,
adaptation, and vulnerability. Part a: global and sectoral aspects.
Contribution of working group II to the fifth assessment report of
the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, pp 869–898
Morgan F, Brown P, Daigneault A (2015) Simulation vs. definition: dif-
fering approaches to setting probabilities for agent behaviour. Land
4:914–937. https://doi.org/10.3390/land4040914
Müller B, Bohn F, Dressler G, Groeneveld J, Klassert C, Martin R,
Schlüter M, Schulze J, Weise H, Schwarz N (2013) Describing
human decisions in agent-based models - ODD + D, an extension
of the ODD protocol. Environ Model Softw 48:37–48. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2013.06.003
Mulligan M, Burke S, Douglas C (2014) Environmental change and
migration between Europe and its neighbours. In: Piguet E,
Laczko F (eds) People on the move in a changing climate. The
Regional Impact of Environmental Change on Migration.
Springer, Dordrecht, pp 49–79
Murray-Rust D, Brown C, van Vliet J, Alam SJ, Robinson DT, Verburg
PH, Rounsevell M (2014) Combining agent functional types, capi-
tals and services to model land use dynamics. Environ Model Softw
59:187–201. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2014.05.019
Nay JJ, Abkowitz M, Chu E, Gallagher D, Wright H (2014) A review of
decision-support models for adaptation to climate change in the
context of development. Clim Dev 6:357–367. https://doi.org/10.
1080/17565529.2014.912196
Nilsson M, Persson Å (2012) Reprint of BCan Earth system interactions
be governed? Governance functions for linking climate change mit-
igation with land use, freshwater and biodiversity protection^. Ecol
Econ 81:10–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.06.020
O’Sullivan D, Evans T, Manson S, Metcalf S, Ligmann-Zielinska A,
Bone C (2015) Strategic directions for agent-based modeling:
avoiding the YAAWN syndrome. J Land Use Sci 11:177–187.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1747423x.2015.1030463
Paloniemi R, Apostolopoulou E, Primmer E, Grodzinska-Jurcak M,
Henle K, Ring I, Kettunen M, Tzanopoulos J, Potts S, van den
HS, Marty P, McConville A, Similä J (2012) Biodiversity conserva-
tion across scales: lessons from a science-policy dialogue. Nat
Conserv 2:7–19. https://doi.org/10.3897/natureconservation.2.3144
Parker D,Manson S, Janssen M, HoffmannM, Deadman P (2003) Multi-
agent systems for the simulation of land-use and land-cover change:
a review. Ann Assoc Am Geogr 93:314–337. https://doi.org/10.
1111/1467-8306.9302004
Pattberg P, Widerberg O (2015) Theorising global environmental gover-
nance: key findings and future questions. Millennium J Int Stud 43:
684–705. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829814561773
Pierson P (2000) Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of
politics. Am Polit Sci Rev 94:251–267. https://doi.org/10.2307/
2586011
Polhill JG, Gimona A, Gotts NM (2013) Nonlinearities in biodiversity
incentive schemes: a study using an integrated agent-based and
metacommunity model. Environ Model Softw 45:74–91. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2012.11.011
Porter JR, Xie L, Challinor AJ, Cochrane K, Howden SM, Iqbal MM,
Lobell DB, Travasso MI (2014) Food security and food production
systems. In: Field CB, Barros VR, Dokken DJ, Mach KJ,
Mastrandrea MD, Bilir TE, Chatterjee M, Ebi KL, Estrada YO,
Genova RC, Girma B, Kissel ES, Levy AN, MacCracken S,
Mastrandrea PR, White LL (eds) Climate change 2014: impacts,
adaptation, and vulnerability. Part a: global and sectoral aspects.
Contribution of working group II to the fifth assessment report of
the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, pp 485–534
Prishchepov AV, Radeloff VC, Baumann M, Kuemmerle T, Mueller D
(2012) Effects of institutional changes on land use: agricultural land
abandonment during the transition from state-command to market-
driven economies in post-Soviet Eastern Europe. Environ Res Lett
7:024021. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/7/2/024021
Robinson DT, Sun S, Hutchins M, Riolo RL, Brown DG, Parker DC,
Filatova T, Currie WS, Kiger S (2013) Effects of land markets and
land management on ecosystem function: a framework for model-
ling exurban land-change. Environ Model Softw 45:129–140.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2012.06.016
Rounsevell MDA, Robinson DT, Murray-Rust D (2012) From actors to
agents in socio-ecological systems models. Philos Trans R Soc B
Biol Sci 367:259–269. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2011.0187
Rounsevell MDA, Arneth A, Alexander P, Brown DG, de Noblet-
Ducoudre N, Ellis E, Finnigan J, Galvin K, Grigg N, Harman I,
Lennox J, Magliocca N, Parker D, O’Neill BC, Verburg PH,
Young O (2014) Towards decision-based global land use models
for improved understanding of the Earth system. Earth Syst
Dynam 5:117–137. https://doi.org/10.5194/esd-5-117-2014
Schouten M, Opdam P, Polman N, Westerhof E (2013) Resilience-based
governance in rural landscapes: experiments with agri-environment
schemes using a spatially explicit agent-based model. Land Use
Policy 30:934–943. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2012.06.008
Schulze J, Müller B, Groeneveld J, GrimmV (2017) Agent-based model-
ling of social-ecological systems: achievements, challenges, and a
way forward. J Artif Soc Soc Simul 20:8. https://doi.org/10.18564/
jasss.3423
Stolze M, Lampkin N (2009) Policy for organic farming: rationale and
concepts. Food Policy 34:237–244. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
foodpol.2009.03.005
Stürck J, Levers C, van der Zanden EH, Schulp CJE, Verkerk PJ,
Kuemmerle T, Helming J, Lotze-Campen H, Tabeau A, Popp A,
Schrammeijer E, Verburg P (2015) Simulating and delineating fu-
ture land change trajectories across Europe. Reg Environ Chang 18:
733–749. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-015-0876-0
Tàbara JD, Jäger J, Mangalagiu D, Grasso M (2018) Defining transfor-
mative climate science to address high-end climate change. Reg
Environ Chang. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-018-1288-8
Uthes S, Matzdorf B (2012) Studies on agri-environmental measures: a
survey of the literature. EnvironManag 51:251–266. https://doi.org/
10.1007/s00267-012-9959-6
van Zanten BT, Verburg PH, Espinosa M, Gomez-y-Paloma S,
Galimberti G, Kantelhardt J, Kapfer M, Lefebvre M, Manrique R,
Piorr A, Raggi M, Schaller L, Targetti S, Zasada I, Viaggi D (2013)
European agricultural landscapes, common agricultural policy and
ecosystem services: a review. Agron Sustain Dev 34:309–325.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13593-013-0183-4
Modelling dynamic effects of multi-scale institutions on land use change
Verburg PH (2006) Simulating feedbacks in land use and land cover
change models. Landsc Ecol 21:1171–1183. https://doi.org/10.
1007/s10980-006-0029-4
Verburg PH, Overmars KP (2009) Combining top-down and bottom-up
dynamics in land use modeling: exploring the future of abandoned
farmlands in Europe with the Dyna-CLUE model. Landsc Ecol 24:
1167–1181. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10980-009-9355-7
Willemen L, Veldkamp A, Verburg PH, Hein L, Leemans R (2012) A
multi-scale modelling approach for analysing landscape service
dynamics. J Environ Manag 100:86–95. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jenvman.2012.01.022
WilsonGA, Hart K (2000) Financial imperative or conservation concern?
EU farmers’ motivations for participation in voluntary agri-
environmental schemes. Environ Plan A 32:2161–2185. https://
doi.org/10.1068/a3311
York AM, Janssen MA, Carlson LA (2006) Diversity of incentives for
private forest landowners: an assessment of programs in Indiana,
USA. Land Use Policy 23:542–550. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
landusepol.2005.04.001
S. Holzhauer et al.
